Predictions 2024

Slightly Off-Topic History

Some of the largest aerial dogfights of the jet age occurred during the Second Taiwan Straits Crisis in September 1958. Armed with the first air-to-air missiles, Taiwan’s US made F-86 Sabres shot down 31 Soviet made Chinese MiG jets for the loss of two in return.

Taiwan's offshore islands are close to China

The Kinmen Islands are really close to China

The option of a naval blockade

The likelihood of a naval blockade rather than an invasion has been popular in the media.

Generally speaking, there are two types of blockades:

1. A close blockade, where warships are positioned just outside the blockaded harbours. This is a highly effective approach that requires relatively few warships. The downside is this only works if the country you're blockading can't sink your ships. With thousands of land and air launched anti-ship missiles, Taiwan currently has the ability to ensure this isn't a viable option for China.
2. An area blockade, requiring a significantly larger fleet to stop ships offshore. This is potentially doable but difficult due to:

• The proximity of Japan to the north and the Philippines to the south,
• Moving from the shallow waters of the Taiwan Strait into the deep waters of the Pacific would be a popular location for US attack submarines.

The reason we view a blockade as an unlikely is that it passes the timing of a potential hot war to Taiwan and its allies.

Why? Because, at a time of its choosing, Taiwan or the US can send a ship to test the blockade:

• If allowed to pass, then China can pack up and go home as there is no blockade.
• If stopped, then China has committed an act of war, with the navy spread across a wide area and open to attack. From this point it would be difficult to regroup to support a successful invasion.

The most likely option

Considering the limitations of targeting offshore islands and of implementing a blockade, a full-scale invasion becomes the most likely course of action for China. Using the same rationale as Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour, such an invasion would likely be accompanied by pre-emptive strikes against Guam and potentially Okinawa, aimed at delaying a US military response and turning public opinion in the US against defending Taiwan.

• Just as with Pearl Harbour, or more recently with September 11, history suggests that an attack on the United States is unlikely to result in peace.

China's invasion strategy would likely aim for a swift and overwhelming assault on Taiwan's defences and major ports, combined with simultaneous attempts at a decapitation strike against Taiwan's leadership. China has made significant investments in both military and civilian fleets of specialist ships to support this ambitious plan. Their commitment to building these forces and holding regular training exercises suggests a clear intention to use them.

The option of doing nothing

To understand the likelihood of a Taiwan invasion, we look to the past to understand the future. The Taiwan Straits crises of the past exemplify China's long-standing commitment to bring Taiwan under its control. Their inability to succeed in previous attempts was due to:

• Chinese weakness and US strength, and
• the logistical difficulties in crossing 150km of difficult waters while in range of Taiwan's military.

Over the last decade, China has vastly increased the power of its military, and while 2025/2026 is earlier than China wanted, they may see a rapidly strengthening Taiwan (and Japan), combined with Taiwan's ever more important place in a digital world as a signal that the best time is now.

The window of opportunity for China is narrowing

• Taiwan's defences are strengthening with new indigenous missiles, international support, and a strategy that avoids head-to-head confrontation.
• Regional dynamics, such as Japan's rearmament, the Philippines moving closer to the US, and regional pacts further complicate China's plans.
• Ukraine and the Middle East are diverting US attention.
• China may well judge the current US National Security Advisor as overly pre-occupied with avoiding escalation and direct confrontation rather than winning wars.

Final thoughts

This does not mean that war is a certainty.

• Recent corruption cases in the Rocket Force, and the revelation that some new missile silos were filled with water rather than missiles suggests that China will also be taking a close look at its actual capabilities vs the capabilities they have on paper. It is unknows at this point what effect this may have.
• If China sees a Taiwan that is bristling with weapons and allies that are committed to fight, then the status quo will likely continue. To ensure peace we must be ready for war.